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ABSTRACT
Four case studies of American Indian nations' treatment of matrimonial real property disputes under formal tribal law, customary law,
state law, and some mixtures are presented. Derivative lessons suggest that First Nations, supported by the Government of Canada, ought
to develop their own rules and adjudication mechanisms to address these disputes.
RÉSUM É
Quatre études de cas sur la façon dont les nations améridiennes traitent les disputes pour les biens immobiliers matrimoniaux sous la
loi tribale formelle, le droit coutum ier, le droit interne et quelques mélanges sont présentés. Des leçons dérivées suggèrent que les
Premières nations, appuyées par le gouvernement du Canada, devraient développer leurs propres règles et méchanism es d'adjudication
pour adresser ces disputes.
INTRODUCTION
The Indian Act, which determines many
aspects of law on First Nations reserves in Canada,
does not include provisions for the division of
reserve-based real property when marriages break
down. Provincial law also is limited with regard to
these issues. Under the First Nations Land
Management Act, a few First Nations have had the
opportunity to develop rules for property division
that accord with community interests and needs, but
the fact remains that most settlements occur in the
absence of clear policy. Women and children may
suffer (and, anecdotally, are suffering) as a result.
The situation in the United States (US)
bears comparison. In some American Indian
nations, tribal law, either formal or customary,
g o v e rn s  d iv o rc e  a n d  the  d iv is io n  o f
reservation-based real property. There also are
Indian nations in which state law holds great sway,
and still others that may be more similar to the
Canadian situation, where the policy regime that
applies - and even what the policy is - may be
unclear. 
This paper presents case study based
learning about the way issues concerning real
property on American Indian lands are addressed
when couples divorce, offers observations based on
the cases, and concludes with lessons learned.
Ultimately, it speaks to the relative success of
Native sovereignty over matrimonial real property,
the usefulness of indigenous policy and dispute
resolution systems, and the impact of non-Native
dominance over divorce and the disposition of
property. 
METHODOLOGY
Four sites were selected for the study,
based on an a priori determination of the type of
legal regime that might govern matrimonial real
property. We expected that decisions would be
governed by formal tribal law in the Navajo Nation,
at least partially by informal or customary tribal law
in the Hopi Tribe, by state law in the Luiseño Indian
nations, and by a somewhat unclear legal regime in
the Native Village of Barrow. W e contacted key
informants at each site and made site visits. Where
possible, we reviewed legal cases, tribal
constitutions, and tribal codes. Finally, we
conducted a brief literature review, to better
understand Native views of divorce, property, and
gender rights. 
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THE FOUR CASES
The Navajo Nation
The Navajo Nation is the largest American
Indian nation in the United States. With a resident
membership of 168,000 and another 80,000
members living near the reservation, it spans 16.2
million acres and stretches across parts of New
Mexico, Arizona, and Utah (Navajo Nation
Washington Office 2003). 
The traditional Navajo justice system
r e l i e d  o n  N a v a j o  c o m m o n  l a w  a n d
consensus-oriented judicial procedures, and its aim
was simple: to restore harmony. These approaches
were weakened by the forced introduction of
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Courts of Indian
Offenses in 1892 and the Nation's adoption of a
Western court system in 1959. Only in the early
1980s were judicial branch officials able to
undertake reform. In 1981, the Chief Justice began
reintegrating traditional law into the court system.
In 1982, the judicial branch created the
Peacemaking Division, a forum for community-led,
consensus-based dispute resolution based on the
Navajo philosophy of K'e, which values
responsibility, respect, and harmony. Through these
reforms, Navajo common and statutory laws have
become the laws of preference in the Nation's
courts, and 250 Peacemakers help to resolve a wide
variety of individual, business, and property
disputes. The Nation is now known for having one
of the strongest, most independent, and most mature
court systems in Indian Country.
Navajo rules governing divorce used to be
quite simple. Because couples lived with the wife's
clan, a woman seeking to divorce simply placed her
husband's saddle (and other personal belongings)
outside the door of their home. Instead of focusing
on property settlements, traditional divorce
practices emphasized family and clan relationships.
Today, the familial focus remains, but a more
complex set of rules and procedures governs
divorce. These guidelines are laid out in the Navajo
Nation Code and further specified by judicial rules
and common law. 
At Navajo (and indeed throughout Indian
Country), a variety of real assets may enter into
divorce proceedings, including fee land, individual
trust land, homesite leases, land-use permits,
houses, grazing permits, and mining claims.
Significantly, none of these save homes (hogans)
are traditional types of real property - the rest are
by-products of colonialism, in that the US
government created them through the Dawes Act
("Allotment Act") and other re-organizations of
Indian land and claims. Also traditionally, in a
matrilineal and matrilocal society like Navajo, the
hogan would not have been in dispute; it would
belong to the wife. Yet today, the Navajo courts
have jurisdiction over all of these properties in a
divorce. The code states, "Each divorce decree shall
provide for a fair and just settlement of property
rights between the parties" (Navajo Nation Code,
Title 9, Chapter 5, Section 404).
The code's emphasis on equity is
reinforced in Shorty v. Shorty, A-CV-05-08 (Court
of Appeals of the Navajo Nation, 1982), which
establishes a definition of equity that is not
synonymous with equality. Rather, it focuses on the
well-being of the divorcing parties and of their
families and clans. Among other factors, Navajo
conceptions of equity take into account both
spouses' economic circumstances, children's needs,
and customary Navajo law (such as rules dictated
by clan relationships). The idea is that the parties
should "start divorced life on some sort of equitable
basis" (Navajo Law Digest 1995, p. 189).
This consideration gives rise to outcomes
that appear dissimilar. In Johnson v. Johnson,
A-CV-02-79 (Court of Appeals of the Navajo
Nation, 1980), the Court awarded land leases to a
mother (leases which had been passed from a father
to his son and which the son claimed as his separate
property), although she was charged to hold them in
trust for the children produced by the marriage. In
Livingston v. Livingston, 5 Nav. R. 35 (Court of
Appeals of the Navajo Nation, 1985), the Court
ordered a wife to pay her husband, who had been
given custody of the children, for his interest in the
hogan. The ruling in Shorty gave each party the
opportunity to purchase the other's interest in the
family home, to sell the home and home site lease
and equally divide the profits, or to have the wife
remain in the home until the youngest child reached
majority and then sell and divide the profits. The
common thread in these decisions is adherence to
Navajo conceptions of equity, fairness, and justice
rather than strict (and perhaps more Western)
adherence to a "divide equally" rule. 
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Still other cases support and clarify this
claim. Charley v. Charley, 3 Nav. R. 30 (Court of
Appeals of the Navajo Nation, 1980), states,
"Where the state and tribal standards are different,
...the District Court must be fair and just, but it does
not need to be equal in the division." Begay v.
Begay, A-CV-06-89 (Supreme Court of the Navajo
Nation, 1989), directs trial judges to consider equal
division a starting point and, if they believe an
unequal division to be more equitable, to document
the reasons why. One reading of the persistent focus
of Navajo courts on equitable division is that the
standard provides judges with adequate scope to
protect parties to suits (especially women and
children) who might not be best protected by equal
division.
The Hopi Tribe
The 1.56 million-acre Hopi Reservation is
located in northeastern Arizona and is home to
7,500 Hopi citizens (Tiller 1996, 210). The Tribe is
known for its intense village loyalties and deep
traditional village culture. Indeed, the Tribe is a
confederation of twelve villages, in which the
central tribal council has authority over certain "big
picture" issues but more local issues are
village-only matters. 
In Hopi tradition, marriage is a community
relationship, not just a personal one between a
husband and wife, and there are specific ceremonial
duties the bride, groom, and other family members
must perform. Marriage is seen as affecting the
cosmos, weather, and crops, which underscores the
Hopi belief that marriage is forever. "Wedding
robes are only made once and cannot be made
again," noted a Hopi elder. (Notwithstanding these
traditional decrees, Hopi informants also indicated
that, similar to Navajo custom, if a woman wanted
a man to leave a relationship, she would place his
footwear outside the house.) 
Clearly, Hopi customary beliefs and
modern practices have diverged. As one Hopi Judge
explained, the mere fact that single parents are now
common demonstrates that the customs of marriage
and family are not adhered to the same way as they
were in the past. These contemporary realities,
including divorce and the issues it raises, have
required the Tribe to craft policies and procedures
to address them. 
Hopi residents file dissolution of marriage
petitions in the Hopi Tribal Court. Because the Hopi
code requires a residency term before the tribal
court can assume jurisdiction, some divorce
proceedings are, of necessity, filed in state courts
instead. Yet in either case, if there is property at
Hopi linked to one of the parties, the affected
village has original jurisdiction to decide any
controversies that arise concerning it.
Village power to decide such matters is
acknowledged in the Hopi Constitution and in case
law. The constitution reserves to individual villages
the power to address family disputes and regulate
family relations in villages. In Ross v. Sulu, No
Docket Number Available (Appellate Court of the
Hopi Tribe, 1991), the court notes, "Only after the
village resolves the underlying dispute pursuant to
established custom can the parties come to tribal
court for enforcement of their rights as determined
by the village...."
An important concept behind the practice
of making property decisions in divorce at the
village level is that this may be the fairest place for
the decisions to be made. Since village
decisionmakers have to live with disputants and/or
their relatives, there is a strong incentive to create
an equitable and peace-promoting resolution.
Indeed, informants stressed that much of the focus
in such decisionmaking at Hopi has been on the
appropriate and equitable use of property as
opposed to the determination of ownership, which
has not been central to Hopi tradition. 
The Luiseño Indian Nations of California
This case is drawn from the experience of
several of the seven Luiseño Indian nations in
southern California. Because each has a relatively
small population and land area (average population
is 650 and average land area is 6,050 acres, U.S.
Department of the Interior 1999 and 2000,
respectively), the larger group provides more
examples of the complexities of real property
questions in divorce. Before turning to examples,
however, it is necessary to consider the
ramifications of Public Law 83-280.
84 Flies Away, Garrow & Jorgensen
Public Law 83-280
This federal law establishes, for six states
(including California and Alaska), state jurisdiction
over criminal matters and some civil disputes,
including divorce, in Indian Country. Therefore,
California state courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over divorce, and tribal members can seek divorce
decrees from either a state or tribal court. However,
a variety of factors, including limited funding and a
lack of state support (motivated by P.L. 83-280),
has meant that most California-based tribes have yet
to develop courts. Tribal members are forced to use
state courts or not divorce at all. The other wrinkle
in the law is that it reiterates states' inability to
alienate or encumber Indian property that is held in
trust by the federal government. In other words,
P.L. 83-280 places some states squarely in the midst
of divorce matters by giving them concurrent
jurisdiction, but then caps their power by reserving
decisions over trust land to tribes. 
Anecdotes
In introduction, we note that in Luiseño
tradition, divorce was a case of one party simply
leaving the home. Due to assimilation,
intermarriage, and the imposition of Western law,
this method of divorce is no longer possible. Also
historically, Luiseño people did not own real
property. They lived in villages and, depending on
the season, moved from coast to desert. The
reservation system changed this pattern and placed
an emphasis on boundaries, property designation,
and ownership. 
The accounts below bear out the greater
complications in divorce and property settlements
in divorce under the modern regime:
1. A female tribal member sought a
divorce from her husband, who was a member of
another Native nation. Before marrying, she built a
home on land leased from her tribe. In the divorce,
the husband claimed he should be compensated
$60,000 for improvements to the house, which had
been appraised at $160,000. The wife argued that
because the house stood on inalienable tribal land,
the appraisal was too high. Her lawyer didn't know
how to handle this issue, nor did other state court
personnel, and the suit stalled for five years, costing
the wife over $8,000 in attorney fees.
On reflection, the wife feels that the state
system failed her. The players' lack of familiarity
with tribal regulations and federal Indian law
destroyed any security she felt in the process. She
bore the cost of high legal fees and of lost earnings
whenever she had to go to court. Although her
former spouse is delinquent in child support, her
experience has convinced her that pursuing
enforcement of the award is not worthwhile. By
contrast, she was hopeful about the potential of a
tribal court. A tribal court judge would likely have
been better informed and, thus, able to craft a more
timely resolution that protected both parties'
property rights.
2. A tribal member wife and her
non-Native husband lived in a home owned by the
tribe's housing authority, leased by the wife, and
located on trust land. The wife did not feel the home
or the land should be considered real property
relevant to the case because she did not own them
and because her husband, as a non-member, was
ineligible to sign a tribal housing authority lease or
receive a tribal land assignment. But his attorney
was adamant that the properties be part of the case.
Despite verifying that the wife did not own the land
or the house, he continued to refer to her "receipt"
of the home in negotiations. As a result, the
settlement papers noted that the house and land
went to the wife. 
Even after the settlement, the dispute
spilled over into arguments about other property.
The husband contended that he was due
compensation for upgrades to the house, a claim he
dropped only when the wife allowed him three of
the family's four cars (the settlement had granted
them each two). 
3. A tribal-member woman seeking a
divorce has a home on trust land. Her partner is a
member of another tribe and has subjected her to
domestic violence. She was initially hesitant to seek
relief via the state courts and sought help from her
tribal council. The council told her that its only
option absent a tribal court was to banish the
husband, which it was disinclined to do. In order to
gain relief, the woman has had to seek help from the
county sheriff and, for her divorce, the state courts.
Now she is worried about how issues concerning
the family home and land will be decided,
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particularly because of the tribal council's
reluctance to act on the domestic violence issues. 
These anecdotes show that state court
dominance can cause hardship for Luiseño band
members, and may even increase the possibility of
inequitable outcomes. Because state court personnel
are unfamiliar with (for instance) tribes' jurisdiction
over trust land, housing lease and home ownership
regulations in Indian Country, and the remedies that
might protect all parties to a suit, state action tends
to increase the time and monetary cost required to
resolve real property disputes in divorce. These
drawbacks, combined with the fact that tribes
themselves are ill-equipped to address the division
of trust property, so that issues are left unresolved
or left to the parties to work out on their own, can
also result in inequitable outcomes.
The Native Village of Barrow
The Native Village of Barrow (NVB) is
one of more than 200 Native villages (tribes) in
Alaska. It is the northernmost village in the Arctic
Slope Borough, and thus, is geographically remote.
The people are Inupiaq and share language and
culture with the indigenous people of northern
Canada and Greenland. 
We initially expected that this isolated area
might be far from the interest of the state, and
because NVB has a fledging tribal court, its
capacity to address divorce and property concerns
in divorce might also be limited. Thus, we thought
NVB might be a case in which there was a "policy
vacuum."
This expectation was not entirely borne
out. Inquiries revealed that while the tribal court is
not yet ready to hear divorce cases, state courts
actively hear cases involving NVB members. When
pressed on the issue of Native real property,
however, the local Superior Court judge conceded
that he could not rule on the division of trust land.
Decisions affecting trust properties must be made
outside the state system, and in NVB, there is
currently no regularized system for doing so. While
NVB has a court, codes are not in place that would
allow its judges to rule on matrimonial real property
held in trust. Instead, affected families tend to work
these issues out on their own and report settlements
back to the Director of Realty for NVB, who then
registers the information with the BIA Land Office;
if issues cannot be resolved locally, a US
Department of the Interior administrative law judge
in Anchorage may make a ruling.
Viewed historically, both divorce and
property issues have become more complicated in
NVB. With regard to divorce, in the past, "Neither
husband nor wife had recourse to legal sanctions
enforced at a higher level, so family conflicts were
worked out between spouses, each calling upon
close consanguine kin for assistance as needed.
Husband or wife could terminate the union at any
time by simply packing up and leaving" (Blackman
1989, 150). Informants noted that even today, some
people do not divorce unless they wish to marry
someone else. 
With regard to property, for the Inupiaq
"the issue of land ownership had always been one
of 'relation' rather than possession. That is, the right
to use a given site was based on one's relation to
previous generations of kin who hunted in the area
and the animals located there" (Chance 2003,
webpage). Modern divergence from this tradition
has created a complicated landholding pattern in
Alaska, one that is largely dictated by the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act. The Act extinguished
Native title to some 365 million acres, paid
compensation to 13 regional Native corporations,
conveyed fee simple title to 40 million acres to the
regional corporations and 200-plus village
corporations, and left Alaska tribes themselves
without "reservation" land bases. While existing
and petitioned allotments were not extinguished, the
Act also ended the process through which individual
Alaska Natives could acquire allotted trust land.
This history means that in NVB, tribal members
live on a mixture of fee and trust land, and that the
corpora tions and  B IA wield substantial
decision-making power over real property.
Reflecting on changes in divorce and
landholding practices, one informant reasoned that
as Western divorce becomes increasingly common,
property disputes in divorce also will increase.
Once the tribal court is able to hear divorce cases,
these future litigants will be able to file in either
tribal or state court. Her expectation is that many
will choose tribal court, due to the judges' better
understanding of Alaska Natives' property claims;
however, some disputants may still choose state
court, based on the perception that in a small
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community like Barrow, it is impossible for tribal
decisionmakers to be impartial. Weighing the pros
and cons, she suggested that providing the option of
filing in either tribal or state court (which, it must
be stressed, is possible only in P.L. 83-280 states)
may be the best alternative, and certainly better than
having no choice at all (which is the current
situation). 
In summary, the situation in NVB is
similar to that of the Luiseño nations, in which state
courts can settle most issues in divorces that involve
tribal members but cannot make decisions about
matrimonial real property held in trust. Yet there
also appears to be a more active informal system for
addressing such property concerns (supported in
part by the NVB Director of Realty), as well a
formal venue (the tribal court) in which claims can
be heard once applicable codes are developed.
OBSERVATIONS
The cases lead to several important
observations about the division of matrimonial real
property on American Indian reservations.
First, there are two tribes in our sample
with well-developed policy for the disposition of
real property when couples divorce. The Navajo
Nation has the most explicit set of rules, with a
mention of property issues in its code, common law,
and case law. The Hopi Tribe also has rules,
although they are less transparent, as property
issues typically are resolved at the village level
according to local custom. 
These nations are not alone. Many
American Indian nations have at least some formal
(and probably more informal or customary) rules
for resolving real property questions in divorce. For
example, divorce codes for the Chitimacha Tribe of
Louisiana and the Fort Peck Assiniboine and Sioux
Tribes recognize tribal court authority to make
orders regarding the distribution of trust land. The
Eastern Band of Cherokee's code states that the
tribal council must decide the division of trust
property when couples divorce. The Mashantucket
Pequot Nation's code notes that the tribal court may
order the division or sale of non-trust real property.
By contrast, the Luiseño Indian nations
and the Native Village of Barrow are examples of
tribes that lack formal rules to guide
decisionmaking about real property in divorce. As
a result, problems can arise. Rulings may be
inconsistent, inappropriate (especially if made by a
state court), or not made at all. The NVB case
draws particular attention to the importance of tribal
policy, as a tribal court exists there but the tribe has
yet to develop law for the court to interpret, act
upon, and enforce. Thus, the Village continues to
cede jurisdiction over divorce to the state and
accept the partial solutions state courts are able to
offer. 
Second, there is a critical difference
between Native nations that have both rules for
settling matrimonial real property questions as well
as tribal dispute resolution forums, and nations that
do not have the two. Again, the Navajo Nation and
Hopi Tribe offer positive examples. They have, as
noted above, code and custom for the resolution of
such questions, and they possess indigenous forums
that are able to hear cases. These tribes, in
possession of both rules and dispute resolution
mechanisms, are able to offer complete solutions to
the issues at hand.
NVB has a court but no rules governing
divorce or real property disputes in divorce, which
makes the court ineffective with regard to these
issues. The Luiseño tribes have neither rules nor
courts. Already, there is pressure in the Native
Village of Barrow to develop law so the court can
exercise its jurisdiction. The Luiseño are one step
behind: members believe that the development of
court infrastructure would create a similar pressure
for policy development, so that important real
property questions (such as who may stay in a
family home, what counts as real property, and how
property on trust land should be valued) can be
resolved. Indeed, concerns like these have led
several of the Luiseño nations to begin work on an
intertribal court system.
Third, in our sample, parties to the cases
generally viewed the outcomes from tribal dispute
resolution processes as equitable, whereas state
court-mediated outcomes were less often seen as
fair. This greater dissatisfaction stems from several
problems litigants experience in state courts: judges
and lawyers usually do not understand the issues
concerning real property in Indian Country,
non-Indian courts do not apply indigenous
standards, the courts lack jurisdiction over trust
property, and appeals can be difficult.
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The Navajo and Hopi cases are important
examples of equitable decisionmaking by tribal
courts. Navajo courts are empowered to take many
factors into account in their divorce settlements,
which leads to resolutions that are equitable by
Navajo standards. At Hopi, informants noted that
only village leaders know the traditions that will
result in indigenously equitable solutions to real
property disputes. Moreover, a resolution based on
foreign law and grounded in non-Hopi beliefs
would run the risk of disregarding other community
interests, which could cause further conflict among
village members.
When an initial settlement is considered
unfair, indigenous systems also offer more
appropriate and approachable means of appeal.
Both the Navajo and Hopi systems have higher
courts that are able to hear questions raised by
lower bodies' rulings, and these courts are used
when matrimonial real property questions arise. In
fact, a number of Navajo cases examined for this
research were appeals. By contrast, when state court
settlements are unsatisfactory, anecdotal evidence
suggests that parties may be too disenchanted by the
system to continue along the state route of appeal.
This is not to say that tribal systems are
necessarily fair and state systems unfair. As one
NVB informant noted, the close relationships of
Village members might threaten the equitability of
tribal court outcomes. Yet the advantage offered by
state forums would have to be substantial - it would
have to  o ffse t the equity-compromising
disadvantages noted above. 
Tribal forums may produce results that are
more equitable for non-members as well. Like tribal
members, they would avoid wasting time and
money as state court personnel acquainted
themselves with Native real property issues. And
although the options for real property division will
be different from the options that exist when two
non-Indians divorce, tribal courts' greater familiarity
with the possibilities increases the probability that
some remunerative property settlement will be
reached, which is fairer than the alternative of no
settlement.
Fourth, tribal courts that are in good form
are better able to deal with situations in which there
is a lack of clarity in law or practice. Their complete
jurisdiction helps judges see the full picture, and as
needed, craft new case law. Navajo courts have
even adopted the practice common in US courts of
recommending legislation. Such evolution may be
possible in state law, but it is less likely, may not fit
each tribe in the state's borders, and could not reach
out to trust property issues.
Fifth, much of the confusion over the
division of on-reservation matrimonial real
property is the result of US government policy. For
example, the kinds of real property that are disputed
have generally been created by US policy, whether
they are trust lands, fee lands, mining claims,
grazing sites, etc. Disputants and courts have had to
find ways to work with these types of property and
even to deal with the concept of "real property,"
which is foreign to many Native societies.
Additionally, US policy accounts for some
of the underdevelopment of tribal courts. As noted,
P.L. 83-280 limits some tribes' incentives to
develop courts. The Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) has had even broader impact. The
constitutions of tribes organized under the IRA
(some 200 of the 560 Native nations in the US,
Porter 1997), and even tribal constitutions merely
based on the IRA model (a category that includes
even more tribes), often note only that tribal
councils are empowered to create judiciaries. Even
when an IRA council creates a judicial body, it
frequently lacks independence. 
Notably, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has
not significantly impeded the disposition of
reservation-based matrimonial real property.
Typically, the Bureau only records changes to trust
land holdings that result from divorce proceedings,
so the main possibilities of a harmful effect are if it
has kept bad records (some probate records are in
terrible shape) or if it is very slow in taking action.
Finally, we note that informants in this
research focused more on self-governance concerns
than on gender-related issues. Even when asked
directly, none of our interviewees felt that the
policy questions surrounding matrimonial real
property disputes touched on particular "women's
issues." Indeed, the only reference made to gender
concerns at all underscored the preference one
Native woman would have had for a tribal (and,
hence, self-governance-promoting) hearing: The
wife in one of the Luiseño examples criticized the
state court judge for acting like she "was not even
there, which is difficult for Indian women,
especially when there are children involved,
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because they want to speak up about their children
in court. But the judges and attorneys always tell
the mothers to be quiet."
Various justifications can be offered for
American Indian women's focus on their nations'
rights to sovereignty ahead of specific gender rights.
Echoing the preceding paragraph, many may feel
that gender rights are better protected in culturally
appropriate forums. It also has been argued that
colonialism is an overriding problem: "We are
American Indian women, in that order. We are
oppressed, first and foremost, as American Indians,
as peoples colonized by the United States of
America, not as women" (Lorelei DeCora Means,
quoted in Jaimes and Halsey 1992, 314). Further,
many American Indian women do not support, and
disassociate themselves from, Western conceptions
of feminism (Jaimes and Halsey 1992;
Monture-Okannee 1993; Shoemaker 1995). This is
not to say that gender concerns are unimportant to
American Indian women. Osburn (1995), for
example, argues that colonizers either assumed the
existence of or imposed patriarchal social structures
in their interactions with Native cultures, to Native
women's detriment. The point here is only that
gender issues have not been dominant in the
constellation of rights issues with which American
Indian women struggle. 
It also may be that in the US setting,
conflicts between self-government rights and
gender rights have been few. The overwhelming
attention focused on one example - Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (U.S. Supreme
Court 1978), in which the Court upholds the
Pueblo's right to establish its own membership rules
and, hence, Julia Martinez's children are denied
membership - may itself be evidence of the paucity
of additional examples. Nonetheless, we too turn to
the case in our conclusion, as the controversy
surrounding its outcome provides a critical
perspective for assessing the policy lessons that
emerge from this research.
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
U.S. EXPERIENCE
The examples and observations give rise to
several lessons for First Nations and Canada as
activists and government officials struggle to create
better regimes for the division of matrimonial real
property on Native lands.
1. Tribal sovereignty over matrimonial
real property issues has been more
successful than the alternative(s). 
This study attempted to examine four
situations among American Indian nations:
governance of matrimonial real property decisions
by formal tribal law, by tribal custom, by state law,
and by an unclear legal regime. In the end, we
found that two rather than four situations are
typical: those in which tribal law (often a mix of
formal law and custom) dominates and those in
which there is a combination of state law and tribal
responsibility. Upon examination, we conclude that
the resolution of real property disputes under tribal
law and by tribal courts has been more successful
than dispute resolution under the alternative regime.
Here we stress that the record demonstrates the
importance of both rules and dispute resolution
mechanisms. Native nations with one but not the
other cannot offer the same advantages in the
disposition of matrimonial real property in divorce.
Because they possess jurisdiction over most
reservation-based real property likely to enter
divorce disputes and because tribal court actors tend
to be more knowledgeable of the laws relating to
such property, tribal forums applying tribal law are
able to make complete settlements that are generally
perceived as fair. 
2. If external bodies must rule in
matrimonial real property disputes, the
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  k n o w le d g e a b l e
decisionmakers would improve outcomes.
One of the advantages of tribal forums is
the greater likelihood that decisionmakers are
knowledgeable about the laws and customs that
affect rights to reservation-based real property.
When decisionmaking must occur in non-tribal
forums, the quality of the dispute processes and
outcomes would improve if this knowledge could
be replicated.
For example, some Native nations lack the
resources to administer their own courts, and one
option for them is to participate in multi-tribal
courts. Judges are less likely to share litigants'
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traditions, but they are likely to have a good
understanding of on-reservation real property
issues, which increases the probability that concerns
will be settled in the best manner that tribal and
federal law allow. This is also an idea proposed by
First Nations women, some of whom desire "a
specialized tribunal administered by First Nations to
provide increased access and greater cultural
awareness in judicial-type decisionmaking
concerning matrimonial real property in the reserve
context" (Cornet and Lendor 2002, 46). 
Of course, many other tribes - including
those in the process of developing courts and
developing rules to govern matrimonial real
property disputes - must continue to rely on
non-Indian courts. We stress that even in these
cases, if court personnel have basic knowledge of
the issues surrounding on-reservation real property,
disputants' sense of wasted time would likely
decrease, and the actual content of settlements
improve.
3. It takes time for Native nations to
develop appropriate rules and adjudication
mechanisms to govern matrimonial real
property disputes. 
Native nations developing rules and
systems to govern the division of matrimonial real
property face a number of decisions about what will
work best for their citizens. This can be slow going.
As shown in the Luiseño and NVB cases,
development also may be slowed by financial
constraints, human capital constraints, and the need
for institutional coordination. Thus, the process
takes time, and an unpredictable amount for each
Native nation. 
One possible difficulty is that some parties
to divorces may be harmed while waiting for
particular Native nations to put rules and systems
capable of addressing matrimonial real property
questions in place. With that in mind, we believe it
is advisable to speed the processes of code and
court development along. One approach is to
provide incentives for progress. Examples exist in
other areas of law: The US Department of Justice
Drug Courts Program Office has provided funding
to American Indian tribes for the development of
drug courts, institutions aimed at combating alcohol
and drug use, and the US Congress has provided
funding through the Children's Justice Act to spur
the creation and improvement of tribal children's
codes. 
_______________
Taken together, the lessons of the
American Indian experience offer a clear policy
prescription for First Nations and Canada: Native
nations ought to develop their own rules and
ad jud ication mechanisms for ad d ress ing
matrimonial real property disputes, and Canada
ought to allow and support (with law, resources,
and time) the development of such institutions. The
ultimate goal would be for each Native nation to
possess rules and adjudication mechanisms
uniquely suited to its circumstances, as indeed,
nations such as the Navajo Nation and Hopi Tribe
already have. 
We expect (in line with the controversy
surrounding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez) that
certain parties to divorces or certain rights groups
will view this variation among Native nations, and
between Native nations and mainstream society, as
a problem with indigenous law and processes.
These differences, interpreted as a "problem," could
then be used as a reason to circumvent tribal rulings
altogether.  
This would be inappropriate. One reason
is that only indigenously chosen rules and systems
are supportive of Native nations' self-government,
which is desirable for reasons beyond tribes'
differential success at resolving matrimonial real
property concerns. Evidence from the American
Ind ian setting demonstrates that greater
socio-economic success tends to accompany greater
self-rule (Cornell and Kalt 1998). To chip away at
self-government, even in ways that seem unrelated
to socio-economic outcomes, tends to diminish that
success. 
Another reason these issues ought to be
resolved by tribes themselves is that Western law is
not based on Native beliefs and principles. Thus,
solutions designed by non-Natives can be a poor fit
and create more problems. This may be especially
true when dealing with issues that affect Native
women, whose history is different from European
women's history (Shoemaker 1995). Furthermore,
individual Native nations' histories vary, so there is
not even one indigenous solution to the perceived
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problems with the division of matrimonial real
property on Native lands (compare Mihesuah 1998).
Some feminist scholars have argued that
such resolute faith in Native nations' law and
processes is misplaced, as current tribal rules and
procedures actually stem from the imposed,
patriarchal practices of colonizers. Indeed, this is
the generalized version of the most persuasive
argument aga inst the M artinez  outcome
(MacKinnon 1987; Resnick 1989). Yet there is a
fundamental problem with this interpretation of
indigenous law and processes, particularly in the
US context: it suggests that Native nations are
monolithically and continuously the powerless
victims of colonial oppression. For instance,
MacKinnon and Resnick contend that early in the
twentieth century tribes were forced to adopt laws
discriminating against women as a means of
protecting tribal land. Arguing from the example of
Santa Clara Pueblo, they miss the fact that many
tribes - even those suffering the same threat of land
loss - upheld less gendered rules when transcribing
their constitutions in the Indian Reorganization era.
They also miss the fact that the Pueblo nations had
long experienced the pressures of colonization
(resisting first the Spanish, and later, Native raiders
from the north and west, Mexicans, and Americans)
and had learned ways to undermine the advances of
colonizers and keep their cultures relatively intact
(Spicer 1962). Rather than suggesting that the laws
written down by Santa Clara in the 1930s were a
necessary accommodation given even more
worrisome colonial advances, a  broader
interpretation of the tribal legal milieu parallels our
conclusion above, that there is a variety of
culturally legitimate Native legal regimes, and
suggests that in transcribing its national
membership/citizenship rules, Santa Clara Pueblo
made a positive choice for a particular cultural
practice. (We understand that in Canada,
MacKinnon and Resnick's argument may have more
traction, given a history of patriarchal relations
created by the Indian Act. Yet the point remains that
some First Nations have broken away from the
strictures - patriarchal and otherwise - of the Indian
Act and are constituting themselves in more
workable and more indigenous ways. Like
US-based Native nations, First Nations have a
degree of choice.)  
If, when a Native nation has the
opportunity to thoughtfully craft its own codes and
formalize its legal practices, these rules and
procedures nonetheless give rise to divisions of
matrimonial real property that women's rights
advocates view as unacceptable, another argument
is that the Native nation's culture must itself be
patriarchal. What, then, is the right response?
Western feminists acknowledge that this is a
difficult question (Higgins 1996, Okin 1999), and
yet have tended to view gender rights as
fundamental human rights with "trumping" value
(Volpp 2001) - in this case, trumping value over an
indigenous nation's right to self-determination. 
We are hesitant to agree. First, we reiterate
the points made above, that American Indian
women have tended to focus on their nations' rights
to sovereignty and self-determination ahead of
gender rights, and that chipping away at
self-government in any way is likely to have
knock-on effects. Second, we raise the point that
while it is convenient to discuss "a Native nation's
culture," that culture, indeed the culture of every
society, is in flux. If it is already difficult to justify
"sanitizing indigenous cultures" (paraphrasing Gana
1995, 140-41) with the fell swoop of national or
international human rights laws because of the
potentially destabilizing effect of those actions,
feminists should find it even more difficult to do so
when a number of Native nations are already on
self-directed paths of cultural change that point
toward an outcome more in line with the
mainstream. We offer the "problematic" Pueblos
themselves as an example; Prindeville (2004) has
found a mounting, internally driven, wholly
indigenous pressure for improving the status of
women in those societies. Third, we fall back on our
own belief in the trumping value of sovereignty,
that as sovereigns, Native nations have the right to
establish policy, law, and methods of dispute
resolution without interference from outside nations
such as the United States or Canada. In line with
writing that directly addresses the intersection
between tribal sovereignty and the cultural
differences between American Indian societies and
mainstream society, our viewpoint is nuanced by
the understanding that "if sovereignty means
anything, it means the ability of tribes to talk about
very serious issues and to choose from the array of
choices which are available" (Pommersheim 1997,
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466) and that sovereignty includes "maintaining the
customs, traditions and values that define one tribe
from another while simultaneously creating change
from within to ensure an existence that the tribe
defines itself" (Skenandore 2002, 370). In
negotiating these important self-definitional and
cultural issues, some Native nations in the US have
chosen patriarchy, some egalitarian systems, and
some matriarchy. For instance, among the
Haudenosaunee, clan mothers wield tremendous
political and social power, and male citizens tend to
say "that's the way it is for us."
For those still unhappy with the policy
prescription - Native sovereignty over divisions of
matrimonial real property, backed by culturally
appropriate codes and institutions for mediating
these divisions - a remaining refuge is to criticize
indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms
themselves (compare Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (U.S. Supreme Court 2001)), Souter, D.,
concurring, pp. 384-85). We agree that Native
courts do not always "get it right." Some American
Indian tribes' courts are tremendously flawed, in
that politics influence personnel appointments and
decisions, judges and other staff are inadequately
trained, the laws enforced by the court are culturally
inappropriate, etc. Tribal courts suffering from such
problems are less likely to offer the advantages in
the resolution of matrimonial real property disputes
noted above. Yet these are not "Indian problems."
They are more general problems of judicial
development, from which no court system is
exempt, and to avoid the development and use of
indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms is not a
way to avoid them.
In sum, we stand behind the implication of
this research, that indigenous nations in Canada
(constituted at the band level or above - this is a
question of the appropriate "self" in "self
government") ought to develop their own rules and
adjud ication mechanisms for ad d ress ing
matrimonial real property disputes and that the
Government of Canada ought to support them in
this process. For those who remain fearful that
Native jurisdiction will produce negative results for
Native women, we suggest that a more fundamental
problem is the incentive for those who gain power
from illegitimate, Indian Act governments to abuse
that power. In that case, the most productive course
of action for both First Nations citizens and
concerned outsiders is to work toward the creation
of more legitimate First Nations governments
(where "legitimate" is indigenously defined). This
interpretation is a question for further research, and
yet, the suggestion underscores the importance of
crafting culturally appropriate, indigenously
supported laws and institutions of government. Why
not begin with mechanisms that support First
Nations' jurisdiction over matrimonial real property
disputes?  
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